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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
with the demand for accommodations by the colored passengers.28 Should
the court recognize segregation to be an undue preference, the way would
seem to be clear for a federal uniform prohibition of segregation as well as
inequality in comfort and convenience. 29
H. S. H.
CONTRACTS-ARBITRATION AND AWARD-AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE Fu-
TURE DIsPuTES-[Minnesota].-A contract between plaintiff and defendant
contained a provision requiring certain questions to be submitted to arbitra-
tion according to statute, the decision of the arbitrators to be a condition
precedent to any right of legal action. There was an arbitration and an
award, but not according to the statutory procedure. Action was brought
to recover the award. The plaintiff appealed from a decision for the de-
fendants. Held: (two judges dissenting) reversed; since the arbitration
statute expressly preserved the right to common law arbitration, the pro-
ceedings actually had did not lose their validity. A contention that the
defendant had not consented to the common law proceedings was rejected
by the court which proceeded to reverse a long line of cases and to announce
that an agreement to arbitrate all differences to arise under a contract is
not contrary to public policy. The result, as the dissenting opinion points
out, is to declare all agreements to arbitrate, including those under common
law, to be irrevocable. In reaching this decision the majority stated that
public policy is what the legislature declares it to be. The legislature had
enacted an arbitration statute. This statute was taken to be the legislative
approval of the policy of arbitration, and the court proceeded to give effect
to that policy in its broadest sense. Park Construction Co. v. Independent
School District No. 82.1
The view of the court is contrary to the overwhelming weight of author-
ity in this country, which is that provisions for arbitrations of future dis-
putes are revocable. 2 "Such agreements are void-prejudicial to the rights
of citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution, to resort to the courts for the
determination of their rights;"3 being an attempt to oust the courts of their
jurisdiction, they are held to be contrary to public policy and invalid.4
28. Mitchell v. Chicago, R. I. &. P. Ry. Co. (1938) 229 I. C. C. 703.
29. By such recognition the court would in effect be holding that the
federal government has entered the field and as a consequence state laws
would not be allowed to be in conflict with the federal rule. It is to be
noted that this suggestion is predicated solely on the suggestion that the
courts recognize the inequality in segregation.
1. (Minn. 1941) 296 N. W. 475.
2. Sturges, A Treatise on Commercial Arbitrations and Awards (1930)
45. However, there is a distinction generally made between an agreement
providing for the ascertainment of facts by arbitrators, and one providing
for the determination of legal liability. The former are generally upheld.
6 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1938) 5371-5373, sec. 1921.
3. Cocalis v. Nazlides (1923) 308 Ill. 152, 139 N. E. 95. "Void" as used
here apparently has the meaning which Sturges includes in the term "re-
vocable": "* * * a party to such a clause or provision can maintain an action
in court although the action is based upon a cause which is embraced in
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It is not at all clear why a general arbitration agreement should be held
contrary to public policy. The reason generally given is simply the con-
clusion that it must be against such policy to oust the courts of jurisdiction.
This doctrine appears for the first time in Kill v. Hollister,( without cita-
tion of authority. It has been said that the real origin of the idea is ex-
plained by the passing of the Statute of Fined and Penalties, which pre-
cluded- recovery of the face value of penal bonds where they had become
single unless the actual damages justified it. 7 Then, because revocability
could no longer be avoided by the use of bonds, the court felt called upon
to contribute this reason to bolster the doctrine of revocability, first ex-
pounded by Coke in the dictum of Vynior's Case,8 which is still regarded
as the controlling authority for revocability. Once applied, however, the
public policy doctrine crept into the law on the strength of mere repetition.
"Inferior courts may fail to find convincing reasons for it; but the rule
must be obeyed * * *" laments Judge Hough, in United States Asphalt Ref.
Co. v. Trinidad Lake Pet. Co.9 The customary attitude is that of Judge
Cardozo in a concurring opinion in Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R. R.
Co.1O "The jurisdiction of our courts is established by law and is not to be
diminished, any more than it is to be increased, by the convention of the
parties." But, as pointed out in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp.
v. Cocke,11 a contract for submission of controversies to arbitration before
resort to the courts does not attempt to prevent either party from resorting
to the courts where the conditions entitle him to do so, nor is the legal
effect the ousting of the courts from their jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of
which the court is deprived is that of inquiring into and deciding the merits
of the case orginally, but the court still has the jurisdiction to entertain
an action and pronounce a decree in conformance with the award of the
arbitrator; or, if there is discoverable impropriety in the arbitration pro-
the arbitration agreement, such a clause or provision cannot be pleaded in
abatement of or in bar to such an action." Sturges, op. cit. supra, note 2,
at 45.
4. The Howick Hall (D. C. E. D. La. 1925) 10 F. (2d) 162; Continental
Trust Co. v. United Rys. & Electric Co. (D. C. D. Md. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 265;
McCullough v. Clinch-Mitchell Const. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 17;
Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co. (1923) 190 Cal. 665, 214 P. 38, 26 A. L. R. 1070;
Dworkin v. Caledonian Ins. Co. (1920) 285 Mo. 342, 226 S. W. 846; Williams
& Bro. v. Branning Mfg. Co. (1911) 154 N. C. 205, 70 70 S. E. 290, 47 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 337, and cases cited in Annotation, 348 et seq.
5. United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Pet. Co. (D. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1915) 222 Fed. 1006.
6. (K. B. 1746) 1 Wils. K. B. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532.
7. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law (1927) 37 Yale
L. J. 595, 604.
8. (K. B. 1609) 8 Co. 80a and 81b, 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 597; reported as
Wilde v. Vinor (C. P. 1609) 1 Brownl. & Golds. 62, 123 Eng. Rep. 666; also
reported as Vivion v. Wilde (C. P. 1609) 2 Brownl. & Golds. 290, 123 Eng.
Rep. 948. The case is apparently based upon an agency theory.
9. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1915) 222 Fed. 1006.
10. (1914) 211 N. Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653.
11. (Tex. Cic. App. 1933) 56 S. W. (2d) 489.
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ceedings, to disregard them and determine the issues on their merits. 12 The
court is not ousted any more than it is ousted by a release of all right of
action.' 3 In fact, a general arbitration agreement could be characterized as
a release, conditioned upon the occurrence of an event subsequent.' 4
While it seems that a general arbitration agreement does not "oust' the
courts from jurisdiction, nevertheless there is reason for holding in favor
of the doctrine of revocability. Althought it has been pointed out that the
doctrine originated in the mistaken conception of an arbitrator as an
agent,' 5 it has support in the practical field of procedure; for under the
common law the submission is not necessarily accompanied by procedural
safeguards 16 such as invariably are prescribed for statutory arbitration.'7
Retraction of the privilege of revoking common law arbitration agreements
is not accompanied by a corresponding extension of the protective pro-
visions. However, this objection is not necessarily fatal, for, as pointed out
above, if performance of the award is resisted, a court may inquire into the
proceedings on equitable grounds, which should be sufficient to found an
inquiry into the character of the proceedings.'8 Nevertheless, it must be
conceded that such inquiry by the court may be exceedingly difficult due to
the informal character of the common law award. 19
The lack of procedural protection is particularly objectionable where
there is inequality in the bargaining positions of the contracting parties.
".... when the parties stand upon an equal footing, and intelligently and
deliberately, in making their executory contracts, provide for an amicable
adjustment of any difference that may arise, either by arbitration or other-
wise, it is not easy to assign at this day any good reason why the contract
should not stand. .-20 But in a great many contracts, especially those of
the "take it or leave it" variety,21 the parties are not upon an equal footing,
and the more powerful party can insert unfair provisions or instigate un-
fair proceedings which under the view of the court in the principal case,
would have to be attacked in court in order to be avoided.22 In such a case,
12. Cohen, Commercial Arbitration and the Law (1918) 208, 209.
13. Id. at 160.
14. Id. at 175.
15. Id. at 57.
16. E. g., provision for means of compelling testimony and compelling the
attendance of witnesses, and providing that arbitrators and witnesses be
sworn.
17. Sayre, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 609.
18. Ward v. Quinlivin (1874) 57 Mo. 425; Crary v. Goodman (1855)
12 N. Y. 266, 64 Am. Dec. 506; Hoppough v. Struble (1875) 60 N. Y. 430;
Gunn v. Madigan (1871) 28 Wis. 158.
19. Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration (1927) 40 Harv. L.
Rev. 929; 6 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1938) 5392-5398, see. 1928.
20. Pres. etc. of Dela. & H. Canal Co. v. Penn. Coal Co. (1872) 50 N. Y.
250.
21. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States (1930) 282 U. S.
30; Universal Film Exchanges Inc. v. West (1932) 163 Miss. 272, 141 So.
293. A recent consent decree in a motion picture antitrust case provides
for arbitration by the American Arbitration Association. See Note (1941)
50 Yale L. J. 854.
22. Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied
to a Voluntary Proceeding (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1258, 1274; 6 Williston,
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an irrevocable submission to arbitration without procedural devices assuring
a fair hearing involves too great a limitation upon the fundamental right
of appeal to the courts for protection.23 The welcome liberal approach of
the courti in re-examining the bases of a hoary common law doctrine is,
however, more important than the minutiae of the new law of arbitration
which it opens up. These can be shaped by future legislative and judicial
action; for there is nothing in the opinion which precludes the legislature
from making a suitably devised statutory method of arbitration exclusive.
M. G.
CRImINAL CONTEMPT-NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION CONCERNING CLOSED
CASE--RIGHT TO JuRY TRLAL-[Missouri].-An information was filed
against relator, a publishing corporation, and petitioners, the editor and
cartoonist, because of the publication of two editorials and a cartoon
strongly criticizing a trial judge for suggesting a nolle prosequi and dis-
missing a criminal action. The judge, after a hearing, found all three
guilty of contempt, assessed a fine against relator, and imposed sentences
of imprisonment upon petitioners. The Supreme Court of Missouri in quash-
ing the judgments and granting release by habeas corpus, held: published
comment concerning a decided case is not punishable as a contempt of court,
even though it scandalizes the court and tends to bring it into disrepute.
The court, however, rejected a contention that jury trial in contempt pro-
ceedings is essential to procedural due process. State ex rel. Pulitzer Pub-
lishing Co. v. Coleman."
The court bases its holding that the action of a trial judge in dismissing
a case terminates his authority to deal summarily with the publisher of
comment concerning it upon the view that a more technical interpretation
of pendency would restrict permissible discussion so narrowly as to make
it of little practical value in informing the public and serving as a check on
judicial maladministration. 2 Technically, a dismissal does not operate to
conclude a case until the expiration of the term of court, since a dismissal
Contracts (rev. ed. 1938) 5377-5380, see. 1922. An excellent example in
point is Illustration 6, Restatement, Contracts (1932) see. 550, comment a:
"A, on entering the employment of B * * * deposits $65 with B and signs
a contract which provides that B can retain the whole or any part of the
deposit as liquidated damages for any breach by A of the rules of B, and
that C, the president of B, shall be the sole judge of whether the whole
or any part of the deposit is to be retained."
23. Sayre, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 611.
1. Decided with Ex parte Fitzpatrick v. Fitzsimmons and Ex parte
Coghlan v. Fitzsimmons. (Mo. 1941) St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 11,
1941, p. 6A:1.
2. Cf. dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Craig v. Hecht (1923)
263 U. S. 255, 281: "I think * * * that there was no matter pending before
the Court in the sense that it must be to make this kind of contempt possible.
It is not enough that somebody may hereafter move to have something done.
There was nothing then awaiting decision when the petitioner's letter was
published."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss4/24
